Abstract: This paper will consider and compare the federal spending power in three 'mature' federations, Australia, Canada and the United States. One of the issues to be considered will be whether the federal spending power, as interpreted by the relevant courts, is sufficiently broad to deal with the obligations of a central government in current circumstances. In doing so, recurring important issues in fiscal federalism, including the allocation of responsibilities within federal systems and vertical fiscal imbalance, will be noted. The constitutional context in which this issue arises, including the fact that the constitution of each of the countries studied was conceived in times very different from those we face today, and the fact that the role and size of government has similarly radically changed since those times, is important. It is argued that a broad interpretation of the federal government's spending power is needed to provide the necessary constitutional flexibility that would otherwise be forbidden by the formal rigidity of the constitutions and the difficulty in making amendments, particularly in Australia and Canada.
I. Brief Introduction to Fiscal Federalism
Most federal systems have not been designed for effective intergovernmental relations 1 While this paper is primarily about the federal spending power in three federal systems, it is also necessary to briefly discuss the question of relative regulatory responsibility within federal systems. Of course, there is a clear relationship between a government's ability to spend money and a government's ability to exercise control over particular functions. This also raises questions about the ability of a government to raise revenue.
It is generally considered that government functions can be classified into three components:
• stabilization function-the goals here include economic growth, full employment and price stability, and the broad tools available to achieve them include fiscal policy, monetary policy and exchange rate policy. It is generally accepted that in a federal system, this is a function best carried out by the federal government; • distribution function-this refers to the need to equitably distribute income and wealth, typically through progressive taxation and social welfare spending, including health, education, housing. Generally, it is again considered that this function should be performed exclusively by the central government, because a sub-national government's attempts to perform this function may be met by evasive behaviour as capital and labour move to minimize their taxation obligations; • allocation function-this refers to actions by government necessary to ensure efficient allocation of resources, including the provision of public goods, regulatory policies or taxes/subsidies to correct any market failure; here there is no general consensus as to which level of government, or both, in a federal system should have this function.
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In the context of these arguments, other principles are also said to apply. Briefly, there is the argument of subsidiarity, in other words that sub-national governments should, subject to efficiency considerations, be responsible for those services whose benefits are confined primarily to their geographic area and for which residents should have a choice over both the quantity and quality of service. 3 There is the argument that sub-national governments are better able to discern tax/service preferences of their residents and to respond appropriately, and the argument that competition between sub-national governments in terms of tax/service delivery leads to better outcomes, greater policy experimentation, greater choice for citizens etc. 4 On the other hand, the argument for sub-national governments in terms of service delivery (and associated expenditure) is weaker where expenditure leads to spillover effects in other jurisdictions; the theory is that the sub-national government will not take these spillover effects into account in deciding on the quantity of the service that it will deliver, 5 so left to its own devices it will not decide on the optimal quantity of those services. Further, some of the beneficiaries of the service may not pay for the service in terms of taxation, which is generally not considered optimal. There is also the argument in terms of economies of scale generated by national rather than subnational service delivery, and arguments why in some cases there should be uniformity in service delivery. 6 For example, in respect of some services, it may be that a minimum level nationwide should be provided, and the best way to make this happen is arguably by centralizing delivery of that service. Some research has cast doubt on whether the subsidiarity principle should be accepted. 7 Further difficulties arise where services are delivered by a combination of levels of government in terms of blurring of responsibilities, and one level of government seeking to transfer blame and risk to the other level of government. 8 It has been noted elsewhere that forces of globalization, together with other factors, have tended to increase the range of issues seen to be national in character, reducing the range of issues seen as purely local. 9 There is debate at a philosophical level as to which level of 4 Oates, above n.2 at 11-13; Anne Twomey and Glenn Withers, Federalist Paper I: Australia's Federal Future, Report (Council for Australian Federation: Canberra, 2007) 9-14; C. Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure ' (1956) It is generally considered to be good policy that a government which spends money has the responsibility of raising it. This argument is defendable in terms of that government being accountable to the people for the money it has spent, and that it may have an incentive to closely monitor its expenditure levels if it is responsible for extracting it from voters. The phrase 'vertical fiscal imbalance' (VFI) refers to the situation where there is a mismatch between expenditure commitments and revenue raising capacity within a federation. Others have pointed out that, as a general trend, VFI is worsening in those nations with both central and regional governments; in other words, the mismatch between spending and expenditure is growing rather than narrowing. 11 While the reasons for this mismatch are complex, certainly one of them is the limited access that sub-national governments enjoy to certain kinds of tax. There is extensive literature on the kinds of taxes best levied at one level of government or another; it is often said that taxes such as income, corporate and value-added taxes are best 10 Access Economics, The Costs of Federalism: Report by Access Economics for the Business Council of Australia (2006) 14. 11 Joumard and Kongsrud, above n. 8 at 6. This is partly because of the practical limit on the kinds of taxes that can be levied at sub-national level.
levied at the national level due to the mobility of the base, while property taxes are ideally levied at the sub-national level.
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As has been pointed out on many occasions, Australia's federal system is characterized by a high degree of VFI. 13 According to the OECD, in Australia state and local governments are responsible for 39.7 per cent of total government spending, yet raise only 17.2 per cent of the revenue, compared with respective figures in Canada of 58.7 per cent and 44.1 per cent, and the United States of 54 per cent and 31.7 per cent.
14 In other words, of the three federations studied in this paper, the gap between the amount raised and the amount spent is, by far, greatest in Australia, and is least in Canada.
Vertical fiscal imbalance is often seen to be problematic, in particular because governments that aren't responsible for raising money may be more careless in how they spend it.
15 VFI may blur the lines of accountability between different levels of government. It may lead cash-starved levels of government to resort to, or persist with, clearly inefficient kinds of taxation, leading to market distortions and misallocation of resources. 16 12 Ibid. at 23-35; Warren, above n. 2 at 60-2; Laubach, above n. 7 at 23-30. As Access Economics put it succinctly: 'globalisation is resulting in a relative increase in transactions across borders-there is greater mobility among people, business operations, the sourcing of business inputs and capital. That means there is a steadily improving case for taxes to be raised at the Federal level-and hence there is a steadily building case for taking spending responsibilities away from the States': above n. 10 at 13. VFI has generally become more pronounced in Australia since federation, as the taxes within the Commonwealth's control have grown in importance, and as states have given up certain forms of taxation. Fenna talks about the 'natural upward migration of taxing responsibility, as explained by the theory of fiscal federalism', 17 as well as the practical constraint on the levying of taxation at sub-national level due to the mobility of individuals that might be the subject of such taxation 18 ; in practice this often means that sub-national taxes are best levied on immobile tax bases. This effectively means that more of the tax raising responsibility tends to belong at the national level. As Access Economics put it succinctly:
People and money are becoming more mobile. Because of that, it makes increasing sense for taxes to be raised at the Federal level -as taxes are easier to avoid or get competed away at the State level.
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States in Australia have relatively narrow tax bases. Section 90 of the Constitution prohibits them from levying customs and excise duties; however all of the revenues from the federally raised goods and services tax go to the states. By agreement with the Commonwealth, the states vacated the income tax field in 1942 and have not returned to it, though they are legally free to do so, as they would be to levy corporate tax. They are left with payroll tax and land tax, both of which are relatively efficient taxes, as well as transactions taxes, which are highly inefficient taxes, as well as relying to a large extent on federal government grants.
In contrast, Canadian provinces raise revenue from a broader base of taxes, including personal income and corporate tax, sales tax, and property tax. Approximately 60 per cent of their taxation revenue comes from income and sales tax, with about 10 per cent from payroll and property tax, and the rest from inefficient taxes. 20 States in the United States rely on income taxation for approximately 39 per cent of their state tax revenue, with about 33 per cent from sales tax. About 25 per cent is derived from inefficient taxes, with low reliance on payroll and property tax. 21 Approximately one-third of state revenues is derived from federal government grants.
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Given the record in each federal system studied, and evidence in other federal systems, of a mismatch between revenue raising and expenditure commitments, it is natural to ask of any federation whether one level of government or the other in a federation should have more or less responsibilities. That is a question for another day. 17 Fenna, above n. 15 at 514. 18 In practice, this often means that sub-national taxes are best levied on immobile tax bases. 19 Access Economics, above n. 10 at 13: 'globalisation is resulting in a relative increase in transactions across borders-there is greater mobility among people, business operations, the sourcing of business inputs, and capital'. 20 Watts, above n. 14; Warren, above n. 2 at 66. 21 Laubach, above n. 7; Warren, above n. 2 at 67. 22 Warren, above n. 2 at 79.
The purpose of this paper is narrower; specifically, to investigate what powers the federal government in each jurisdiction studied has (or needs) to use this 'excess money' 23 in areas that have not been expressly assigned to it by the Constitution.
II. The Federal Government's Spending Power in Each
Jurisdiction Studied i. Canada Unlike the other two federations studied, Canadian constitutional laws do not include an explicit power of the federal government to spend money. Section 91(3) of the Constitution Act 1867 provides a list of federal powers, including the raising of money through taxation, but does not expressly provide for the ability to spend the money.
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There are a range of views as to the source and extent, if any, 25 of the federal government's spending power. These include that the power is justified by the royal prerogative and common law, 26 or is implicit in the federal government's legislative power over public property, 27 or is implicit in the existence of the Consolidated Revenue Fund, 28 or exists because the federal government has in fact exercised the power for many years, 29 or some other reason. 30 According to one leading jurist, the power depends on whether the spending is coercive or not:
Parliament may spend or lend its funds to any government or institution or individual it chooses, for any purpose it chooses; and that it may 23 I use the term 'excess money' to mean money that the federal government has left over after it has fulfilled its spending commitments in areas that have been expressly granted to it by the terms of the Constitution. attach to any grant or loan any condition it chooses, including conditions it could not directly legislate. There is a distinction, in my view, between compulsory regulation, which can obviously be accomplished only by legislation enacted within the limits of legislative power, and spending or lending or contracting, which either imposes no obligations on the recipient . . . or obligations which are voluntarily assumed by the recipient . . . There is no compelling reason to confine spending or lending or contracting within the limits of legislative power, because in those functions the government is not purporting to exercise any peculiarly governmental authority over its subjects.
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In an early decision, the Privy Council appeared to suggest limits on the ability of the federal government to spend:
That the Dominion may impose for the purpose of creating a fund for special purposes and may apply that fund for making contributions to the public interest to individuals, corporations or public authorities could not as a general proposition be denied . . . But assuming that the Dominion has collected by means of taxation a fund, it by no means follows that any legislation which disposes of it is necessarily within Dominion competence.
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Not surprisingly, at a similar time Lord Atkin in the Privy Council described Canada's federal system in terms of 'watertight compartments'. As he put it, 'while the ship of state now sails on larger ventures . . . she still retains the watertight compartments which are essential to her original structure'. 
ii. Australia
There is not and never has been a rational basis for the federal spending power in Australia. 36 Section 81 of the Commonwealth Constitution provides the federal government with a power to make appropriations of money 'for the purposes of the Commonwealth'. This section is complemented by a power in s. 96 to make conditional grants to states. again an issue quite separate from the question of the validity of any regulation of the subject matter. 45 The High Court recently re-considered its views on these issues in Pape v Federal Commissioner of Taxation. 46 That case concerned the validity of the federal government's response to the 'global financial crisis'; this response included the payment of $900 to various taxpayers, in an effort to stimulate the economy and deal with the 'crisis'. A majority of the court (Heydon J dissenting) validated the measures. The case raised various issues, most particularly here the interpretation to be given to the s. 81 appropriations provision and the s. 61 executive power.
French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ concluded that s. 81 reflected established principles of responsible government, including the need for proposed expenditure to be approved by Parliament. 47 It was not a source of substantive power to the Commonwealth 48 ; it contained words of limitation rather than words of empowerment. on whatever subject matter it wished. 50 The phrase 'purposes of the Commonwealth' meant purposes otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statutes made under it. 51 It was not confined to legislative power. Here, s. 61 was the relevant head of power which validated the appropriations. 52 The majority accepted formulations of the s. 61 power in earlier cases that it conferred on the Executive power to engage in activities and enterprises peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation and which cannot otherwise be carried on for the nation's benefit. 53 This was the ambit also of the spending aspect of the s. 61 power. It was a valid exercise of s. 61 to spend money to avoid or mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis, and the expenditure was of a scale and required timeframe that it was peculiarly within the capacity of the national government. 54 The court reiterated that the Executive could not act under s. 61 merely because it believed that a matter was of national interest and concern. 55 One difficulty in expressing the ambit of the Commonwealth's spending power in this way is that it creates uncertainty. As one specific example, judges will differ, and have differed, in their view on the question of whether welfare spending, a carried out by a national government. 57 Of the majority judges who upheld the legislation, much of the reasoning was on the basis that an appropriation was not justiciable; however, Jacobs J alluded to the broad scope of the appropriations power:
The purposes of the Commonwealth [within s. 81] may not only fall within a subject matter of general or particular power prescribed in the Constitution but may also be other purposes which now adhere fully to Australia as a nation externally and internally sovereign. The growth of national identity results in a corresponding growth in the area of activities which have an Australian rather than a local flavour. Thus, the complexity and values of a modern society result in a need for coordination and integration of ways and means of planning for that complexity and reflecting those values. Inquiries of a national scale are necessary and likewise planning on a national scale must be carried out. Moreover, the complexity of society, with its various interrelated needs, requires co-ordination of services designed to meet those needs. Research and exploration likewise have a national, rather than a local, flavour . . . The Australian Assistance Plan is an expenditure of money in the exercise by the Commonwealth of its executive power to formulate and co-ordinate plans and purposes which require national rather than local planning and of its legislative power to appropriate funds accordingly . . . It is (also) an expenditure of money which is incidental to the execution by the Commonwealth of its wide powers respecting social welfare. 58 Further, such a test increases the likelihood that a federal appropriation will be challenged on the basis that it is not within a head of power in s. 51, s. 61 or elsewhere. Such an outcome has been criticized by previous members of the High Court. For example, Murphy J in Victoria v Commonwealth claimed:
To ascertain whether these appropriations are referable to one of the enumerated powers [other than s. 81] would involve exhaustive inquiry into the boundaries of the enumerated powers. The appropriation for those purposes not within the scope of the enumerated powers would, on the plaintiff's contention, be unconstitutional. Hundreds of items of appropriation since federation and many hundreds of millions of dollars would have been unlawfully appropriated and spent. The chilling effect that such an interpretation would have on governmental and parliamentary initiatives is obvious. It is one for stultifying government. In the same case, Mason J stated:
It is not lightly to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution intended to circumscribe the process of parliamentary appropriation by the constraints of constitutional power and thereby to expose the items in an Appropriation Act to judicial scrutiny and declarations of invalidity. Consequences more detrimental and prejudicial to the process of Parliament would be difficult to conceive. Any item in the Act would be subject to a declaration of invalidity after the Act is passed, even after the moneys in question are withdrawn from Consolidated Revenue and perhaps even after the moneys are expended, for an appropriation, if it be unlawful and subject to a declaration of invalidity, does not cease to have that character because acts have taken place on the faith of it.
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Mason J noted the practice in many jurisdictions to provide a short description of the particular items to be dealt with in an Appropriation Act. In many cases, this was because the items of expenditure had not been thought through at this point. Practically, it was impossible that this short description could now be used as a basis for testing the constitutionality of an appropriation, yet that is what would occur if an appropriation needed to be supported by a head of power outside s. 81 itself. iii. United States Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution provides Congress with power to 'lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States'. In relation to what the Article says about Congress's ability to appropriate (spend) money, two main views have competed for attention: (a) the narrow view, that the power of appropriation is limited to the purposes for which Congress has express legislative power elsewhere in the Constitution 62 ; and (b) the broad view, that the Article is a grant of power to spend for purposes not necessarily expressly provided for in the Constitution. Jefferson. 63 This is often referred to as the 'Hamilton view': 'it is therefore, of necessity, left to the discretion of the National Legislature to pronounce upon the objects which concern the general welfare and for which, under that description, an appropriation of money is requisite and proper': Alexander Hamilton, The first major case considering the clause was United States v Butler. 64 There proceeds of a tax on agricultural processors was used to subsidize farmers who agreed to take land out of production. The federal government had designed the programme to reduce food production, hoping that a diminished supply would stimulate the price of agricultural products. It argued that the Act was justified under Article 1, section 8.
The Supreme Court found, confusingly, that Congress's power to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes was not limited by the direct grants of legislative power in the Constitution. However, the plan was unconstitutional, because it involved practical (though not legal) coercion of farmers to cease or reduce production, which was impermissible. Congress could not tax for purposes within the exclusive province of the states.
Apparently similar questions were answered differently in the 1937 decision of Steward Machine Co v Davis. Congress's Social Security Act established a national social security system funded by a tax on employers with eight or more staff, allowing employers to deduct most of their contribution to qualifying state unemployment plans. The aim of this provision was to accommodate states with existing social security programmes, and encourage others to establish programmes. Qualifying state unemployment plans were those where the states deposited all moneys collected into a federal fund. The federal government would then assist the state in administering its plan for the unemployed. Steward unsuccessfully challenged the legislation.
The court agreed that Congress could not use its spending power to coerce the states into participating in federal programmes; to do so would destroy the autonomy of the states and upset the balance of powers between the federal government and state governments. While at some point the court noted pressure could turn into compulsion, 65 on the facts there was no inducement; states could abstain if they wished. The court accepted a coercion test based on legalities rather than practicalities. 66 Since this decision, the authority of Congress to spend money on whatever it wishes has largely gone sense'. Note that this power in the United States includes the power to make grants to states, a power specifically given to the federal government in Australia in a separate section of the Constitution (s. 96) to the appropriations power (s. 81): Saunders, above n. 36 at 374. 64 (1936) 297 US 1. 65 Steward Machine Co v Davis 301 US 548, 590 (1937). 66 As Cardozo J put it: 'every rebate from a tax when conditioned upon conduct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law into endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which choice becomes impossible. Till now the law has been guided by a robust common sense which assumes the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in solution to its problems' (589-90). The court distinguished Butler on its facts.
unchallenged. 67 This broad view of Congress's spending power has, not surprisingly, been both endorsed 68 and criticized 69 by commentators.
The court has applied this test of coercion in subsequent cases. For example, in South Dakota v Dole, 70 the challenged legislation involved a federal statutory provision authorizing the withholding of 5 per cent of highway funds from any state not raising its drinking age to 21. The federal government was seeking greater uniformity in the drinking age across America and a higher age than was the case in many states in order to tackle road accident numbers. South Dakota argued the provision usurped state power to regulate alcohol, a power reserved to the states by the 21st Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected the challenge on the basis that the provision did not directly regulate states' drinking ages; it merely encouraged states to raise their drinking ages. 71 Chief Justice Rehnquist, not a noted centralist, concluded that 'objectives not thought to be within Article I's enumerated legislative fields . . . may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds'. 72 The effect of this decision was that Congress could use the spending power not only to exercise rights not expressly granted to it by the Constitution, but could also exercise powers specifically denied to them. 73 Other possible limits that have been suggested on the ability of Congress to spend pursuant to section 8 include that the measures not impact on essential state government functions, and there be some kind of 'germaneness' or relation between the conditions imposed on any spending, i.e. that they bear some relation to the purpose of the spending. In the first case, this limit has been discarded 74 ; in the second case, the limit remains, but has been rarely applied to strike down spending. 75 Part of the Court's deference to Congress in its judgment of what is for the 'general welfare' of the country is explained by Bagenstos thus:
Any doctrine that would put the courts in the position of secondguessing Congress's determination of what is in the 'general welfare' will necessarily raise the concern that the courts are repeating what is understood to be the mistake of Lochner v New York-the judicial arrogation of authority to decide whether legislation is in face in the general interest.
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III. Forces Within Federal Systems i. Requirements of the Nation Change from the Original Division of Powers
It is trite to observe that since the Constitutions of the countries studied were formulated, very significant changes have occurred in the economy, society and culture of those nations. All documents are products of their time; constitutions are no different. Certainly, at the time the original Canadian Constitution was written and at the time the Australian Constitution was written, liberalism was the dominant ideology. Liberalism is a strong theme in some of the early twentiethcentury decisions of the United States Supreme Court. 77 The conception of the role of government was vastly different from what is expected today in a modern welfare state. Indeed, it is part of the genius of the documents that they have endured as long as they have, written in and for very different times from the times of today. Writing back in 1950, James Buchanan observed these changes, and the difficulties they posed for federal finance:
The emerging fiscal problem has been only one of the many created by the progressive national integration of the economic system within a decentralised political structure. 79 As Windeyer J put it:
The colonies which in 1901 became States in the new Commonwealth were not before then sovereign bodies in any strict legal sense; and certainly the Constitution did not make them so. They were selfgoverning colonies which, when the Commonwealth came into existence as a new Dominion of the Crown, lost some of their former powers and gained no new powers. They became components of a federation, the Commonwealth of Australia. It became a nation. Its nationhood was in the course of time to be consolidated by war, by economic and commercial integration, by the unifying influence of federal law, by the decline of dependence upon British naval and military power and by a recognition and acceptance of external interests and obligations. With these developments the position of the Commonwealth, the federal government, has waxed; and that of the States has waned. In law that is a result of the paramount position of the Commonwealth Parliament in matters of concurrent power. And this legal supremacy has been reinforced in fact by financial dominance. That the Commonwealth would, as time went on, enter progressively, directly or indirectly, into fields that had been formerly been occupied by the States was from an early date seen as likely to occur.
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This passage was expressly adopted in the joint reasons of the High Court in the recent decision New South Wales v Commonwealth, 81 where the court emphatically rejected an argument that the Australian Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the views of the founding fathers. As the joint reasons put it: 'to pursue the identification of what is said to be the framers' intention, much more often than not, is to pursue a mirage'. interpreting a Constitution broad and general in its terms, intended to apply to the varying conditions which the development of our community must involve '. 84 This is similar to the approach taken by the Canadian Supreme Court, which has recently placed on record that it 'takes a progressive approach to ensure that Confederation can be adapted to new social realities'. 85 It is similar to the broad approach taken by the United States Supreme Court. A prime example is the joint reasons in New York v United States: 86 The Federal Government undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers in two senses; first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any government would conduct such activities; and second, because the Framers would not have believed that the Federal Government, rather than the States, would assume such responsibilities . . . the volume of interstate commerce and the range of commonly accepted objects of government regulation have . . . expanded considerably in the last 200 years, and the regulatory authority of Congress has expanded along with them. As interstate commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely local have come to have effects on the national economy, and have accordingly come within the scope of Congress's commerce power . . . As conventional notions of the proper objects of government spending have changed over the years, so has the ability of Congress to fix the terms upon which it shall disburse federal money to the States.
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This trend is certainly not confined to the jurisdictions studied in this paper. Writing of global federalism trends, Hueglin and Fenna noted recently:
Changing circumstances have meant that the original intentions of founders of federations may not fit with a modern economy because the classic legislative federations were established in an altogether different era when the size and scope of government were limited, and it was relatively easy to divide responsibilities and to imagine two levels of government operating in their own spheres with little clash or overlap . . . The mixed economy, the welfare state, the rise of environmental policy, and the enormous increase in taxation have all greatly complicated policy making in a system of divided jurisdiction-as have the 'the idea underlying the doctrine of progressive interpretation is that the Constitution Act 1867, although undeniably a statute, is not a statute like any other: it is a "constituent" or "organic" statute which has to provide the basis for the entire government of a nation over a long period of time. An inflexible interpretation, rooted in the past, would only serve to withhold necessary powers from the Parliament or Legislatures' (above n. 31 at 414); 'it is never seriously doubted that progressive interpretation is necessary and desirable in order to adapt the Constitution to facts that did not exist and could not have been foreseen at the time when it was written' (ibid. at 745). 92 Lord Wright, 'Section 92-A Problem Piece' (1954) 1 Sydney Law Review 145 at 167: 'a constitution is meant to operate for a great many years, or even centuries, and in the course of these years or centuries great changes not only in the circumstances of the nation may take place, but fresh views of construction, perhaps largely influenced by practical exigencies, may be raised and debated, and the fact that for many years a particular solution has been either expressly or tacitly rejected is not conclusive against its being accepted at some future time when the matter has been fully agitated'.
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, and emphasizes the need for the Constitution to be interpreted in accordance with prevailing societal conditions and circumstances. A common feature of both the Australian and Canadian Constitutions is the difficulty of amendment. In Australia, this requires a majority of the people in a majority of states, and an overall majority, to succeed. 93 Of 44 proposals put to the people to change the Constitution, only eight have succeeded. In Canada, domestic amending procedures did not even feature in the Constitution Act 1867; any amendments had to be made by the Imperial Parliament; it was only in 1982 that a domestic amending procedure became available.
It is a lot to expect of any document that it remain relevant and appropriate to a society and world completely transformed from the original circumstances in which it was written. Authors 94 have written of the major challenges facing Canada, including the building of its economy with a coast to coast flow rather than the north-south flow, and a changing conception of the role of government, in particular the rise of the social welfare state in the twentieth century. It is generally thought to be impractical for a provincial government to be the main provider of a social welfare network, given their limited revenue-raising ability and management capacity in relation to such programmes. Arguably, social welfare should not differ across different regions within the same nation, a point reinforced by the wording of s. 36(1) of the Constitution Act 1982. Further strains on the existing federal model were caused by the requirement to finance the effort involved in World War II; more recently, the global financial crisis has created similar difficulties.
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A partial solution to the problems caused by relatively static constitutions as the fundamental document of nations whose needs and challenges constantly evolve has thus been provided by the spending power of the federal government. The waxing of the spending power has occurred as the demands of a modern welfare state evolved, and the list of areas over which many believe a uniform, or more uniform approach, is required, has increased. As a result of the spending power, federal governments have been able to exercise influence and power over areas not assigned to them by the Constitution. Examples in Canada include the provision of old-age benefits and unemployment benefits, and in Australia include federal government spending in health and education. It is argued then that one of the ways in which the fundamental changes in society and the economy that have occurred in the countries studied has been accommodated in the context of nations with constitutions that are very difficult to amend has been the 'fluidity' provided by the federal government's access to a broad spending power to act in areas where citizens legitimately expect a national response, but where the federal government has no direct legislative power in terms of the constitution.
ii. Functions Within a Federal System
It is often argued that it is only a national government that can pursue the most pressing economic functions within a federal system, in particular some kind of redistributive function, including a system of social welfare, 96 as well as responding to major economic challenges of the kind the world has been faced with recently. The classic economic theory of federalism developed by Wallace Oates was that macroeconomic management and redistributive functions were best handled by the federal government. 97 This remains the orthodox economic position.
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(a) Redistribution Function Fenna describes the 'centralising forces on the expenditure side with demand for redistributive social programs financed from progressive taxation'.
99 Kent talks about use of the (federal) spending power being essential to Canadian federation 'otherwise many necessary public services could not be equably and efficiently provided'.
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As Saunders puts it:
It is in relation to social welfare that the constitutional limitations on the general spending power are most likely to come into conflict with the philosophical aims of altruistic federal governments and the practicalities of efficient administration. In the first place there is a widespread, underprovision of the welfare that would otherwise be provided in a national system. 105 In summary then, the position is that a federal government in federal systems needs to have access to a broad spending power in order to carry out the kinds of redistributive activities that economists tend to suggest must practically be carried out at a federal level.
(b) Stabilization Function/Economic Functions Within a Federal System
Here again, the orthodox economic position is that it is the national government that should be responsible for broad management of the economy, including fiscal policy, monetary policy and exchange rate policy. The level of government spending directly affects each of these policies. 106 While this is generally not in dispute, it is not reflected in the constitutions studied. 107 None of them confers direct 108 power on the federal government in respect of economic issues, again a product of the very different circumstances in which these documents were conceived, as compared with the realities of life today. Recent confirmation of the federal government's stabilization function occurred, somewhat ironically, in the High Court of Australia's Pape decision, where a majority of the court was satisfied that only the federal government had the capacity to respond to the challenges posed by the global financial crisis.
The High Court of Australia has sometimes been impressed with economic arguments in its interpretation of the Australian Constitution. 109 In the recent Betfair 110 decision, the court noted:
There have been significant developments in the last twenty years in the Australian legal and economic milieu in which s. 92 operates. 111 Later, the court noted:
The creation and fostering of national markets would further the plan of the Constitution for the creation of a new federal nation and would be expressive of national unity. 112 Similarly, in interpreting the Commonwealth's exclusive constitutional power over certain kinds of taxation, the High Court of Australia has interpreted the power broadly, with the effect of narrowing the tax base available to sub-national governments. Members of the High Court have expressly done so in order to give the Commonwealth broad control over the taxation of commodities so that the execution of their chosen tax policy is not thwarted by state action. 113 Former Chief Justice Mason noted how the Australian economy had changed radically since the 1890s, from a series of loosely connected, small economies to a melding into one national economy where logistical barriers between local economies have dissolved with improvements in communication and transport. 114 Jurists in the United States have similarly noted the implications of unity in terms of economic management, and why sub-national governments cannot be relied upon to pursue stabilization functions within a federal system. Professor Tribe states that sub-national governments exist in order to protect and promote the interests of their own constituents, and they will (understandably) do this at the expense of citizens of other states. 115 Cardozo J noted:
The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division. 116 Pushaw notes that:
The United States has been transformed from predominantly selfsufficient households in agrarian communities (i.e. not engaged in interstate commerce) to an integrated national economy based on commercial agriculture, manufacturing and service. And Congress and the Court cannot help but respond to such changes. 117 The point then is that the federal government in a federal system must have access to a broad spending power in order to manage a modern economy. Economists generally recognize the need for the federal government to carry out stabilization functions or economic management within a federal system. Its spending power is an important tool in this regard.
IV. Conclusion
In conclusion, the following points can be made:
(a) federal governments in federal systems need broad spending powers in order to carry out (at least) the stabilization and redistributive functions that the orthodox economic view in this area suggest can be carried out most effectively by a national rather than sub-national government; (b) a broad spending power to the federal government provides a counterweight to the trend of vertical fiscal imbalance that tends to develop in federal systems, with it being most pronounced in the Australian federal system; (c) the text of the constitutions studied are all difficult to formally amend; (d) this presents challenges when the society and economy for which the constitutions studied seek to provide a framework has changed as substantially as it has over time; (e) the ability of federal governments to resort to a spending power to manage activities that many now argue needs to occur at a national rather than sub-national level has provided the necessary 'fluidity' in constitutional arrangements, given the difficulty of formal amendment.
As a result, courts in the nations studied must continue to uphold a broad interpretation of the federal government's spending power. This is less of a problem in the United States, where the clause has generally been given a broad interpretation by the Supreme Court with few difficulties as a result. It is more pressing in Canada, and a non-obiter decision confirming the existence of the federal spending power from the Supreme Court would be welcome. In Australia, it is most pressing, particularly with the most recent High Court pronouncement in Pape appearing to deny that the federal government has a general spending power, and forcing the federal government, at least in theory, to justify how every appropriation fits within the broad concept of an activity 'peculiarly adapted to the government of a nation'.
